The global city : the de-nationalizing of time and space by Sassen, Saskia
The experience of the global is partial. lt is not an 
allencompassing umbrella. The multiple processes 
that constitute it inhabit and shape specific, rather 
than universal, structurations of the economic, the 
political, the cultural, the subjective. In so doing, 
new spatialities and temporalities are produced, co-
existing yet distinct from the master temporality and 
spatiality of the "national". In the interplay of their 
difference, Strategie openings have emerged. 
Such strategic openings are especially evident in 
sites where these intersecting temporalities and spa-
tialities assume thick and consequential forms. 
Among these sites are, from the perspective of my 
own research experience, global cities. The global 
city is a border zone where the old spatialities and 
temporalities of the national and the new ones of 
the global digital age get engaged. Out of their jux-
taposition comes the possibility of a whole series of 
new economic and cultural projects. There are other 
sites, including microsites, where the juxtapositions 
of different spatialities and temporalities are likely to 
be thick, charged. One question that comes to mind 
is whether art and architecture can, in some of their 
instantiations, represent such a microsite of juxtapo-
sitions, one that captures a key dynamic of transi-
tioning. 
Here 1 explore some of these issues by emphasiz-
ing the locational and institutional embeddedness of 
economic globalization and by arguing that the com-
bination of this embeddedness with the specificity of 
globalization entails the partial unbundling of what 
historically have been constructed as national spa-
tialities and temporalities. This unbundling of the 
national produces openings for other dynamics and 
actors to emerge in the international arena besides 
the national state. Do we see here the formation of a 
new politics? 
The Spatialities and Temporalities of the 
Global 
The insertion of the global in an overwhelmingly na-
tionalized institutional world engenders a partial un-
bundling of that national order. lt is partial because 
the geography of economic globalization is strategic, 
it is not diffuse nor is it an all encompassing condi-
tion.1 Further, it is partial in the sense that national 
space was probably never a unitary condition, even 
though institutionally constructed as such. One way 
of conceptualizing this insertion of the global in the 
national is as a partial and incipient "denationaliza-
tion" (Sassen 1996: chapter 1). This partial unbund-
ling of the national is produced through the practices 
and institutional forms of the global which in turn 
produces its own specific cross-border spatialities 
and distinct temporalities. 
The process of denationalization 1 am seeking to 
specify here cannot be reduced to a geographic con-
ception as was the notion in the heads of the gener-
als who fought the wars for nationalizing territory in 
earlier centuries. This is a highly specialized and stra-
tegic denationalizing of specific institutional arenas: 
Manhattan and the City of London are the equiva-
lent of free trade zones when it comes to finance. 
But it is not Manhattan as a geographic entity, with 
all its layers of activity, and functions and regula-
tions, that is a free trade zone. lt is a highly special-
ized functional or institutional realm that becomes 
denationalized. However, this set of institutions has 
distinct locational patterns - a disproportionate con-
centration in global cities. And this has the effect of 
re-territorializing even the most globalized, digital-
ized and partly dematerialized industries and mar-
kets. 
But this re-territorializing has its own condition-
ality - a complex and dynamic interaction with na-
tional state authority. The strategic spaces where 
many global processes are embedded are often na-
tional; the mechanisms through which new legal 
forms, necessary for globalization, are implemented 
are often part of state institutions; the infrastructure 
that makes possible the hypermobility of financial 
capital at the global scale is embedded in various 
national territories. Thus one way of conceiving of 
the inevitable negotiations with the national is in 
terms of this partial and strategic dynamic of dena-
tionalization.2 
From this perspective, understanding the spatiali-
ty of economic globalization only in terms of hyper-
mobility and space/time compression - the domi-
nant markers in today's conceptualization is inade-
quate. Hypermobility and space/time compression 
need to be produced, and this requires vast concen-
trations of very material and not so mobile facilities 
and infrastructures. And they need to be managed 
and serviced, and this requires mostly place-bound 
labor markets for talent and for low-wage workers. 
The global city is emblematic here, with its vast con-
centrations of hypermobile dematerialized financial 
instruments and the enormous concentrations of 
material and place-bound resources that it takes to 
have the former circulating around the globe in a 
second.3 
Even the vast new economic topography that is 
being implemented through electronic space is one 
moment, one fragment, of an even vaster economic 
chain that is in good part embedded in non-electron-
ic spaces. The most advanced information industries, 
such as finance, are installed only partly in e/ectronic 
space. And so are industries that produce digital 
products, such as software designers. The growing 
digitalization of economic activities has not eliminat-
ed the need for major international business and 
financial centers and all the material resources they 
concentrate, from state of the art telematics infra-
structure to brain talent. We tend to operate in to-
pographies that weave between actual and digital 
space. There is no purely virtual firm or human, even 
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as we are increasingly relocating activities to digital 
spaces and locating digital capacities in the human 
body. 
Yet, complex as these dynamics of newly pro-
duced and newly unbundled spatialities are, they are 
not enough to specify the processes that constitute 
economic globalization. lts strategic economic pro-
jects have emerged in the play between two master/ 
monster temporalities, within which we exist and 
transact (and enact all kinds of microtemporalities). 
one of these is a collapsing temporality, that of the 
national state as a historic institution, a master tem-
porality often thought of as historic time. The other 
is a new temporality, that of economic globalization. 
In the intersection of these two coexisting temporali-
ties we see the formation of new economic dyna-
mics/opportunities that drive and constitute econo-
mic globalization and can be thought of as partly 
denationalized temporalities (see Sassen 2000). 
Elsewhere 1 have argued that what we could 
think of as the dominant narrative or mainstream 
account of economic globalization is a narrative of 
eviction (Sassen 1998: chapter 1). Key concepts in the 
dominant account of globalization, information 
economy, and telematics - all suggest that place no 
longer matters and that the only type of worker that 
matters is the highly educated professional. This 
account privileges the capability for global transmis-
sion over the concentrations of built infrastructure 
that make transmission possible; information outputs 
over the workers producing those outputs, from spe-
cialists to secretaries; and the new transnational cor-
porate culture over the multiplicity of cultural envi-
ronments, including reterritorialized immigrant 
cultures, within which many of the "other" jobs of 
the global information economy take place. In brief, 
the dominant narrative concems itself with the upper 
circuits of capital, not the lower ones, and with the 
global capacities of major economic actors, not the 
infrastructure of facilities and jobs underlying those 
capacities. This narrow focus has the effect of evict-
ing from the account the place-boundedness of sig-
nificant components of the global information econ-
omy and the fact that there is a far broader range of 
types of urban spaces involved than some of the 
master images suggest. 
lnsofar as an economic analysis of the global city 
recovers the broad array of jobs and work cultures 
that are part of the global economy though typically 
not marked as such, it atlows us to examine the pos-
sibility of a new politics of traditionatly disadvan-
taged actors operating in this new transnational eco-
nomic geography. This is a politics that lies at the 
intersection of economic participation in the global 
economy and the politics of the disadvantaged, and 
in that sense would add an economic dimension, 
specifically through those who hold the other jobs in 
the global economy - from factory workers in export 
processing zones to cleaners on Wall Street. 
The centrality of place in a context of global pro-
cesses engenders a transnational economic and 
political opening in the formation of new claims and 
hence in the constitution of entitlements, notably 
rights to place, and, at the limit, in the constitution 
of 'citizenship' (Copjec and Sorkin 1999; Social Jus-
tice 1993). The city has indeed emerged as a site for 
new claims: by global capital which uses the city as 
an "organizational commodity", but also by disad-
vantaged sectors of the urban population, frequently 
as internationalized a presence in large cities as capi-
tal. The denationalizing of urban space and the for-
mation of new claims centered in transnational ac-
tors and involving contestation, raise the question 
Whose city is it? 
1 see this as a type of political opening that con-
tains unifying capacities across national boundaries 
and sharpening conflicts within such boundaries. 
Global capital and the new immigrant workforce are 
two major instances of transnationalized categories 
that have unifying properties internally and find 
themselves in contestation with each other inside 
global cities.4 
Revisiting the Edge 
The partial unbundling of the national through the 
insertion of the global in that national produces a re-
scaling of old hierarchies - running from the local, 
regional, national, on to the global. Going to the 
next scale in terms of size is no longer how integra-
tion is achieved. The local now transacts directly 
with the global - the global installs itself in locals 
and the global is itself constituted through a multi-
plicity of locals.s 
The distinction between the global and the local 
needs to be rethought, notably the assumption 
about the necessity of proximity in the constitution 
of the "local" . For example, both the new interna-
tional professionals and immigrant workers operate 
in contexts which are at the same time local and 
global. The new professionals of finance are mem-
bers of a cross-border culture that is in many ways 
embedded in a global network of "local" places - a 
set of particular international financial centers, with 
much circulation of people, information, capital 
among them. Further, as financial centers, London, 
New York, Zurich, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, are all part 
of an international yet very localized work sub-cul-
ture. We see here "proximity" but not embedded in 
territorial space; rather, a deterritorialized form of 
proximity containing multiple territorial moments. 
And many immigrants will tend to be part of a cross-
border network that connects specific localities -
their new communities and their localities of origin 
in home countries. Though in a manner different 
from the financiers, they nonetheless also have the 
experience of deterritorialized local cultures, not 
predicated on locational proximity.6 
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One way of reading this is as a tearing away of 
the "context" or the "surrounding" and its replace-
ment with the fact of the global. The strategic opera-
tion is not the search for a connection with the 
"surroundings", the context. lt is, rather, installation 
in a strategic cross-border geography constituted 
through multiple "locals" . The spatiality thus pro-
duced can be thought of as a crossborder network of 
specific sites embedded partly in the national but 
constituted through spatial and temporal practices 
that distinguishes these from others, notably those 
of the national as historically constructed.7 
Two points come to mind. 
First, global cities structure a zone that can span the 
globe but it is a zone embedded/juxtaposed with 
older temporalities and spatialities. In the case of the 
research 1 have done on the new interface econo-
mies which dominate the global city, 1 find that it is 
precisely this juxtaposing which produces it. 
1 would be interested in understanding whether 
in the case of the microenvironments represented by 
certain kinds of art and, in a different way, of archi-
tecture, there is a similar dynamic of what appear as 
opposites but are in fact mutual presuppositions. 
Such microenvironments might present themselves 
as self-contained settings, for instance digitally pro-
duced environments or objects made possible by 
digital capacities; yet they may weil arise precisely 
out of the fact of the limitations of the non-digital 
condition and in this sense be engendered, ironically 
by what they are not. 
Financial capital illustrates the more general 
point 1 am trying to make: 1 have argued elsewhere 
that its ascendance and capacity to subject other 
forms of capital to its modes has to do with the co-
existence of the different temporalities (much shorter 
for finance than that of other forms of capital) and 
spatialities (hypermobility of finance's dematerialized 
outputs) of finance compared with other forms of 
capital. Finance by itself, without the other forms of 
capital, could not do much with its own speeds (Da-
vidson 1999). How would this type of juxtapositions 
of differences work out in an analysis of the micro-
environments of certain forms of art and of architec-
ture? 
Microinstantiations of this dynamic, it seems to 
me, might be subject to the same tension between 
global span and sited materialities. Here 1 find inter-
esting conceptual resonances with art projects and 
architecture that negotiate the relationship between 
the almost limitless freedom (so to speak) of certain 
forms and the constraints of the materials that might 
go into its execution. This revisits the tension bet-
ween that which is experienced as limitless, demate-
rialized capacity, as in the digital, and materialities 
that are sited. 
Secondly, although it spans the globe, the new 
zone that is being structured spatially and temporally 
is inhabited/constituted by multiple units or locals -
it is not only a flow of transactions or one large en-
compassing system. The global city is a function of a 
global network - there is no such thing as a single 
global city as you might have had with the empires 
of old, each with its capital. This network is consti-
tuted in terms of nodes of hyperconcentration of ac-
tivities and resources. What connects the nodes is 
dematerialized digital capacity; but the nodes incor-
porate enormous amounts and types of materialities, 
sited materialities. 
This means that we need to decode what is local 
(or national?) in such locals, in what has historically 
been constructed as local because sited in a place. 
And it means specifying what are the new territorial 
and institutional conditionalities of the local (of that 
which is present in a place) in a global and digital era. 
These features raise a question about how the 
edge works, about the presence or absence of inter-
sections between different environments, about 
what happens to contextuality. 
The orientation is simultaneously towards itself 
and towards the global. The intensity of each envi-
ronment's internal transactions is such that it over-
rides all considerations of the broader locality or con-
text within which it exists. The new networked 
subeconomy of the global city occupies a strategic 
geography that is partly deterritorialized, cuts across 
borders and connects a variety of points on the 
globe. lt occupies only a fraction of its "local" set-
ting, its boundaries are not those of the city where it 
is partly located, nor those of the "neighborhood" .8 
How this would work for certain forms of archi-
tecture is not clear to me; but it is possible that the 
issues of the edge, the surrounding, the locus also 
holds for art and for architecture that is marked by 
the intensity of its internal transactions and its cross-
border, transnational rather than contextual orienta-
tion.9 
Conclusion: Unbundlings and New Openings 
The unbundling of the national along with the spe-
cific dynamics of denationalization as instantiated in 
the global city have contributed in creating opera-
tional and conceptual openings for other actors and 
subjects. 
The ascendance of a large variety of non-state 
actors in the international arena signals the expan-
sion of an international civil society. This is clearly a 
contested space, particularly when we consider, for 
example, the logic of the capital market- profitabili-
ty at all costs - against that of the human rights 
regime. But it does represent a space where other 
actors can gain visibility as individuals and as collec-
tive actors, and come out of the invisibility of aggre-
gate membership in a nation-state exclusively repre-
sented by the sovereign. 
There are two strategic dynamics 1 am isolating 
here: 
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a) the incipient denationalizing of specific types of 
national settings, particularly global cities, and 
b) the formation of conceptual and operational 
openings for actors other than the national state in 
cross-border political dynamics, particularly the new 
global corporate actors and those collectivities 
whose experience of membership has not been sub-
sumed fully under nationhood in its modern concep-
tion, e. g. minorities, immigrants, first-nation people, 
women. 
The large city of today emerges as a strategic site 
for these new types of operations. lt is one of the 
next where the formation of new claims materializes 
and assumes concrete forms. The loss of power at 
Notes: 
the national level produces the possibility for new 
forms of power and politics at the subnational level. 
The national as container of social process and pow-
er is cracked. This cracked casing opens up possibili-
ties for a geography of politics that links subnational 
spaces. Cities are foremost in this new geography. 
One question this engenders is how and whether we 
are seeing the formation of a new type of transna-
tional politics that localizes in these cities. 
Author: 
Prof. Saskia Sassen 
University of Chicago 
London School of Economics 
1) There is disagreement in the literature on this point. Some authors see globalization as a universal and 
universalizing condition, especially when it comes to the sphere of consumption. In my research 1 have 
tended to focus on the sphere of " production", by which 1 mean to include the operations necessary for 
the management and coordination of the global economy as weil as those that organize the appropriation 
and control of profit. 
2) Taking as the starting point the specificity of a national/local setting makes it possible to trace the resis-
tances, accomodations, and inertias of the national to the agency of the global, whether this agency 
comes from the outside or from inside of the national. And it makes it possible to capture the many par· 
ticular trajectories through which this insertion materializes in different institutional orders within different 
national states, the multiple forms it assumes, and the multiple cross-border networks that are thereby 
constituted. Dynamic processes and border zones emerge in the juxtapositions of the national and the 
global thus understood. (Sassen 20ooa) 
3) lt is precisely the combination of the spatial dispersal of numerous economic activities and telematic glob-
al integration which has contributed to a strategic role for major cities in the current phase of the world 
economy (see e. g. Knox and Taylor i995; Stren 1996; Cohen et al. 1996). Beyond their sometimes long 
history as centers for world trade and banking, these cities now function as command points in the orga-
nization of the world economy; as key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of this period 
(finance and specialized services for firms); and as sites for the production of innovations in those indus-
tries. These cities have come to concentrate such vast resources and the leading industries have exercised 
such massive influence on the economic and social order of these cities that the possibility of a new type 
of city arises. 
4) Immigration, for instance, is one major process through which a new transnational political economy is 
being constituted, one which is largely embedded in major cities insofar as most immigrants, whether in 
the us, Japan or Western Europe are concentrated in major cities. lt is, in my reading, one of the conStitu-
tive processes of globalization today, even though not recognized or represented as such in mainstream 
accounts of the global economy. 
5) 1 also see this in the political realm, particularly the kind of "global", politics attributed to the Internet. 1 
think of it rather as a multiplicity of localized operations, but with a difference, they are part of the global 
network that is the Internet. This produces a " knowing" that re-marks the local. See the chapter "Elec-
tronic Space and Power", in: Globalization and its Discontents (New York: New Press, i998). 
6) Thus, for instance, in my research on these two types of workers 1 have found that they operate in labor 
markets that are local even though not characterized by territorial proximity as the standard model of 
such markets would have it. 
7) We can then think of the global economy as materializing in a worldwide grid of strategic places, upper-
most among which are major international business and financial centers. We can think of this global grid 
as constituting a new economic geography of centrality, one that cuts across national boundaries and 
across the old North-South divide. See, e. g. Knox and Taylor 1995 (Peraldi and Perrin i996; i993). A key 
aspect of the spatialization of global economic processes which 1 cannot develop here (but see Rotzer 
1996; Futur Anterieur 1996; Sassen i998: chapter 9) is digital space. 
8) On another, larger scale, in my research on global cities 1 found rather clearly that these cities develop a 
stronger orientation towards the global markets than to their hinterlands. Thereby they override a key 
proposition in the urban systems literature, to wit, that cities and urban systems integrate, articulate 
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national territory. This may have been the case during the period when mass manufacturing and mass 
consumption were the dominant growth machines in developed economies and thrived on the possibility 
of anational scale. But it is not today with the ascendance of digitalized, globalized, dematerialized sec-
tors such as finance. 
9) 1 also see this in the political realm , particularly the kind of "global " , politics attributed to the Internet. 1 
think of it rather as a multiplicity of localized operations, but with a difference, they are part of the global 
network that is the Internet. This produces a „knowing" that re-marks the local. See the chapter "Elec-
tronic Space and Power", in: Globalization and its Discontents (New York: New Press, 1998) 
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